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Security Council

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The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1887 (2009), and reaffirming its firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in all its aspects,

Reaffirming the Statement of its President adopted at the Council's meeting at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction,

Underlining that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,

Reaffirming that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Treaty), adopted by the General Assembly by its resolution 50/245 of 10 September 1996, was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, and that States Signatories, by their resolution on 19 November 1996, including paragraph 7 thereof, established the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization,

Recognizing that a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable test ban treaty that has entered into force is the most effective way to ban nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, and that an end to all such nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions will constrain the

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development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that early entry into force of the Treaty will constitute an effective nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measure that would contribute to the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons,

Welcoming progress made towards universalization of the Treaty, *noting* that 183 States have signed the Treaty and 166 States have deposited their instruments of ratification, and *further noting* that of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, whose ratification is needed for its entry into force, 41 have signed and 36 have both signed and ratified the Treaty, including several nuclear weapons States,

Welcoming the efforts of Member States of the PrepCom and its Provisional Technical Secretariat to build all elements of the Treaty's verification regime, unprecedented in its global reach, *recognizing* the maturity of and progress achieved in the establishment of the International Monitoring System (IMS), as well as the satisfactory functioning of the International Data Centre (IDC) that has demonstrated its ability to provide independent and reliable means to ensure compliance with the Treaty once it enters into force, and *emphasizing* the continuing progress in developing, exercising, and demonstrating the advanced technologies and logistical capabilities necessary to execute on-site inspections,

Stressing the vital importance and urgency of achieving the early entry into force of the Treaty,

1. *Urges* all States that have either not signed or not ratified the Treaty, particularly the eight remaining Annex 2 States, to do so without further delay;

2. *Encourages* all State Signatories, including Annex 2 States, to promote the universality and early entry into force of the Treaty;

3. *Recalls* the statements by each of the five nuclear-weapon States, noted by resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the NPT, and *affirms* that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime;

4. *Calls upon* all States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to maintain their moratoria in this regard, *commends* those States' national moratoria, some of which are established by national legislation pending entry into force of the Treaty, *emphasizes* that such moratoria are an example of responsible international behaviour that contributes to international peace and stability and should continue, while stressing that such moratoria do not have the same permanent and legally binding effect as entry into force of the Treaty, and *notes* the Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America of September 15, 2016, in which those States noted that, inter alia, "a nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT";

5. *Underlines* the need to maintain momentum towards completion of all elements of the Treaty verification regime, and in this regard, *calls upon* all States to provide the support required to enable the PrepCom to complete all its tasks in

the most efficient and cost effective way, and *encourages* all States hosting International Monitoring System facilities to transmit data to the IDC on a testing and provisional basis, pending entry into force of the Treaty;

6. *Welcomes* the voluntary information in the national statements in the PrepCom by States listed in Annex 1 to the Protocol to the Treaty as responsible for one or more facilities of the IMS on the status of completing the construction of those facilities as well as regarding the status of transmission of data from their facilities to the IDC, *encourages* States hosting IMS facilities to complete construction of the IMS facilities in a timely manner as provided for by the Treaty and text on the establishment of the PrepCom, and *invites* the Provisional Technical Secretariat to provide a report to all State Signatories within 180 days of the adoption of this resolution on the status of States Signatories assessed contributions to the PrepCom and any additional support provided by State Signatories for the completion of the Treaty's verification regime and for the maintenance and operational needs for the IDC and IMS;

7. *Recognizes* that even absent entry into force of the Treaty the monitoring and analytical elements of the verification regime, operating on a testing and provisional basis, are at the disposal of the international community in conformity with the Treaty and under the guidance of the Preparatory Commission, and that such elements contribute to regional stability as a significant confidence-building measure, and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime;

8. *Affirms* that entry into force of the Treaty will contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security through its effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and through its contribution to nuclear disarmament and *recognizes* that the Provisional Technical Secretariat has demonstrated its utility in bringing tangible scientific and civil benefits to States, for example through early tsunami warnings and seismological monitoring, and in this regard *encourages* the PrepCom to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty, through capacity building and the sharing of relevant expertise on the verification regime;

9. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.